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1. Introduction 
The term “soft budget constraint” (SBC), 2 introduced by Kornai (1979, 1980 and 1986), 
has become a familiar part of  the economics lexicon. Originally formulated by Kornai 
to illuminate economic behavior in socialist economies marked by shortage, the concept 
of SBC is now regularly invoked in the literature on economic transition from socialism 
to capitalism.  Indeed, SBC problems currently constitute a central policy issue in 
transition economies.  But the concept is increasingly acknowledged to be pertinent well 
beyond the realm of socialist and transition economies.  A host of capitalist phenomena, 
ranging from the financial difficulties of Chrysler in the 1980’s to the collapse of the 
banking sector of East Asian economies in the 1990’s, can be usefully thought of in 
SBC terms. 
A large formal literature on soft budget constraints has developed, much of it 
evolving from Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). Several partial surveys of this literature 
have been produced (Maskin, 1996; Dewatripont, Maskin and Roland, 2000; Berglof 
and Roland, 1998; Maskin, 1999; Maskin and Xu, 2001; Mitchell, 1999, 2000; Roland, 
2000). There is also a significant body of work that employs models quite different from 
the  Dewatripont-Maskin variety. 
We have two main objectives in this paper. The first is conceptual clarification. 
Although the intuitive meaning of SBC was reasonably clear from the outset, there is 
still no consensus on a precise definition.  Of course, such ambiguity about a central 
concept is not uncommon in the social sciences.  Interpretations change and develop 
over time, as experience in applying the concept accumulates.  Herein we do not intend 
to adjudicate the differences of opinon and declare which definition is “correct.”  Our 
intention is rather to report on our own current thinking about SBC.  Even so, we 
                                                   
2 HBC correspondingly stands for “hard budget constraint”.  
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believe that the interpretation presented here is comprehensive enough to embrace most 
research on the subject. 
The concept of SBC has been invoked by two distinct groups of economists. 
First, it has been a workhorse for those involved in studying and formulating policy for 
post-socialist economies. There has hardly been a report on transition—by the World 
Bank, the EBRD, or other agencies—in the last decade in which the expressions “soft” 
and “hard budget constraint” have not appeared prominently (see, for instance, World 
Bank, 1997, 1999; EBRD, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001).  Second, there is a sizable group of 
theorists who have attempted to model the SBC phenomenon formally.  In this paper, 
we attempt to  lay out a conceptual apparatus acceptable in both genres and therefore 
useful for integrating research programs.  In addition to interpreting the SBC concept, 
we suggest ways that “softness” might in fact be measured.  Conceptual clarification 
and discussion of measurement are taken up primarily in section 2, although section 3 
touches on these issues too. 
Our other purpose in this paper is to survey the formal theoretical literature on 
SBC. Rather than being exhaustive, the review in section 3 presents the models that we 
have found most instructive; we acknowledge that the selection is somewhat arbitrary 
and reflects our own tastes.  In any case, space constraints preclude discussion of much 
other work that is worthy of note.
3 
We conclude, in section 4, with a discussion of some problems that remain to be 
clarified and some tasks that face those participating in the SBC research program.  
                                                   
3 It should be pointed out that in spite of frequent references to empirical 
observations, we do not aim to provide a compendium of the rich and instructive 
empirical literature on SBC. Such surveys, however, have been undertaken in other 
papers. Kornai (2001) reviews the empirical and economic-policy writings on the SBC 
phenomenon in the postsocialist transition. World Bank (2002) summarizes the 
experien ce to date with hardening budget constraints during this transition.  
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2. Clarification of Concepts: The SBC Syndrome 
The expression “soft budget constraint” syndrome is borrowed from the budget-
constraint terminology of microeconomics. It applies figuratively to a specific, 
comprehensive social  syndrome found in economic reality. A syndrome customarily 
denotes a characteristic configuration of manifestations generated by a particular 
constellation of circumstances. To describe the SBC syndrome involves reviewing both 
the manifestations (the symptoms) and the set of circumstances giving rise to them. 
János Kornai, one of the authors of this article, first observed the SBC 
phenomenon in the Hungarian economy of the 1970’s, a socialist economy 
experimenting with the introduction of mark et reforms (Kornai 1979, 1980). Although 
state-owned enterprises were vested with a moral and financial interest in maximizing 
their profits, the chronic loss-makers among them were not allowed to fail. They were 
always bailed out with financial subsidies  or other instruments. Firms could count on 
surviving even after chronic losses, and this expectation left its mark on their behavior.  
Since Kornai’s first observations, the contention that softness of the budget constraint 
underlies the low efficiency of socialist economies has gained wide acceptance.  From 
the outset, analysis suggested that although the SBC phenomenon is especially 
pervasive in socialist economies, particularly those intent on “reform” (through heavier 
reliance on the market mechanism), it can also appear in other economic environments, 
even in settings based entirely on private ownership (Kornai 1980, 1986). 
Let us begin with a stylized description of the phenomenon. 
2.1  BC-Organizations and S-Organizations 
In our depiction, one organization (e.g., a state-owned enterprise) has a budget 
constraint (let us call this a BC-organization). That is, it must cover its expenditures out 
of its initial endowment and revenue. If it fails to do so and a deficit arises, it cannot 
survive without intervention. Some sort of constraint—on liquidity, solvency, or debt— 
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sets the upper limit on the sustainability of the financial deficit. A BC-organization 
faces an HBC as long as it does not receive outside support to cover its deficit and is 
obliged to reduce or cease its activity if the deficit persists. 
The SBC phenomenon occurs if one or more supporting organizations (S-
organizations) are ready to cover all or part of the deficit. In the case of state-owned 
enterprises, the supporting role is played by one or more organs of the state. This pair of 
actors—a BC-organization in financial difficulty and a supporting S -organization—is 
found in every instance of the SBC phenomenon.
4 We treat the terms “support”, 
“rescue” and “bailout” as synonymous actions to avert financial failure. 
A great many kinds of “BC-organization–S-organization” pairs are found in 
practice. 
(i) Most SBC research has dealt with the corporate sphere. Furthermore, the majority of 
researchers, especially in the early literature, have examined enterprises under  state 
ownership.
5 However, it is not rare for firms in  private ownership to be rescued from 
financial straits. This has been particularly evident in post-socialist transition; 
privatization has by no means ended the practice of bailouts. Indeed, a wide range of 
methods has been used to ensure the survival of firms that have continued to make 
losses after passing into private hands. SBC phenomena have also arisen in many 
capitalist economies through such institutions as state subsidies to  agricultureand 
assistance to “rustbelt” industries. 
(ii) The SBC syndrome also clearly applies to banks and other financial intermediaries 
(although the academic finance literature and the media do not usually apply SBC 
terminology to the financial sector).  It is quite rare these days for a large bank in severe 
                                                   
4 The long-term relationship between an individual on welfare and the agency that 
dispenses payments may appear to fall under this description.  But conventional usage 
of the term “SBC syndrome” is limited to the case where both parties in the relationship 
are organizations. 
 
5 Indeed, most studies mentioned in this paper concentrate on this sphere.   
  6
financial trouble to go out of business; normally, it is allowed to continue operating, 
perhaps after being acquired by another bank.  The role of an S-organization here is 
played by the government or other financial institutions (Aghion, Bolton and Fries, 
1999, Berglof and Roland, 1998, Mitchell, 1998 and 2000, and Tornell, 1999).
6 
(iii) Bailouts are common among various  non-profit organizations, such as hospitals, 
schools and universities that spend more than their revenues (on hospitals, see for 
instance Duggan 2000).  Particularly in transition economies, social-insurance 
institutions covering large numbers of people have not been permitted to go bankrupt. 
Instead, their deficits have been covered  out of the state budget (Kornai and Eggleston, 
2001). 
(iv) Indebted or insolvent local government authorities (cities, municipalities, districts 
etc.) frequently can rely on rescue by central government (Moesen and van 
Cauwenberge, 2000, Wildasin, 1997). 
(v) The SBC syndrome often appears at an international level. National economies that 
have become insolvent and face financial crisis apply for rescue and usually obtain 
assistance from international financial agencies or the international financial community 
(Fischer, 1999). 
2.2  The Motives 
The motives of the BC-organization asking for rescue and support do not require 
much explanation; they are self-evident in the case of profit-motivated organizations. Of 
course, the list above includes many organizations that do not have a profit motive.  But 
in those cases, a survival motive will often work just as effectively.  Indeed, it is a well-
known social psychological principle that the leaders of an organization come to see the 
                                                   
 
6 Notorious examples of financial SBC’s in the United States have included the state 
bail-outs of the Saving and Loan Associations in the 1980’s and 1990’s and the 
privately financed rescue of the Long Term Capital Management investment  
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work of their institution as essential. Furthermore, their positions typically provide them 
not only with a financial livelihood, but with privileges, prestige and power.  Hence, the 
heads of most organizations can be expected to fight tenaciously for their survival. 
The motives of the S-organization, by contrast, are often less transparent. Much 
of the literature on the SBC concentrates precisely on this issue.  Our position is that 
there is no single, universal motivation. Here we offer a classification of a multiplicity 
of possibilities. 
The first criterion by which we can classify motives is according to whether the 
S-organization undertakes the act of rescue voluntarily or by necessity.  To understand 
how rescue may be forced on S -organization, imagine that a BC-organization can 
survive if it avoids its taxes, does not repay its bank loans, or neglects its suppliers’ 
bills. In those instances, of course, the BC-organization has breached its constraints and 
failed to fulfil its civil or contractual obligations.  Suppose, however, that the means of 
enforcing the tax obligation or private contract are prohibitively costly to the tax 
authority, bank, or supplier. Then the S-organization has little option but to tolerate the 
noncompliance, at least temporarily.  Thus, the ability to enforce tax obligations and 
private contracts is an essential condition for ensuring a hard budget constraint.
7 
In other cases, however, the tax authority may deliberately overlook mounting 
tax arrears or the bank may willingly tolerate non-performing debt, because it actually 
wishes to assist the BC-organization. 
What might motivate such voluntary acts on the part of the S-organization? 
                                                                                                                                                    
corporation. 
7 The experience of the post-socialist transition confirms that establishing the 
requisite legal infrastructure is important for hardening the budget constraint. The 
EBRD has devised several indices to measure progress in legal transformation, 
including enactment and enforcement of commercial, financial and bankruptcy 
legislation in conformity with a market economy. It is also attempting to measure the 
extensiveness and effectiveness of these measures. (See EBRD Transition Reports,  
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Let us consider first the most thoroughly studied case, that of a state-owned 
enterprise in a socialist economy (as Hungary, Poland or Yugoslavia used to be) in 
which market-oriented reforms are taking place (implying, in particular, that an 
enterprise’s profit is a meaningful concept). On the one hand, the state wishes the 
enterprise to earn a profit, because this enhances efficiency and provides a source of 
state revenue. On the other hand, the state is concerned that allowing a loss-making 
enterprise to fail will cause many workers to be made redundant, thereby contributing to 
social dissatisfaction and political tension.  This inconsistency in objectives can induce 
a sort of schizophrenia, causing the state to vacillate and issue conflicting orders.  Often 
a division of labor develops, in which one state agency acts tough—demanding that the 
enterprise be profitable— while another stands ready to come to the rescue should the 
enterprise falter.  In other cases, inconsistent behavior occurs sequentially: first, threats 
and promises of severity and then, bailouts. 
We have mentioned fear of unemployment and political unrest as motives for 
softness.  There are, however, many other possible motivations. Here are some of the 
most typical: 
 
1. The S-organization (e.g., a bank or an investor) may be induced by its own 
best business interests to extend more credit or invest more capital in a troubled BC-
organization.  It is led to do so because of previous investments or loans that it would 
lose were operations to discontinue.  
The idea of investing in an enterprise in order to recoup past investment is 
central to Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and a succession of related models that are 
reviewed in  section 3.  This motivation for bailouts merits special attention because 
there is a sense in which it is the most basic explanation for the SBC syndrome: it 
requires no appeal to outside economic and political factors or to corrupt influence.  
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Partly for that reason, it has played an especially important role in the theoretical SBC 
literature. 
 
2.  Paternalism may motivate the S -organization to bail out an ailing enterprise. 
Particularly if the enterprise is owned by the state, state officials may feel protective and 
responsible for it.  In his early writings on the SBC syndrome (e.g., Kornai (1980)), 
Kornai gave particular prominence to this motive.8 
A similar mentality can be found in large corporate organizations consisting of 
many business units (big American conglomerates, Japanese keiretsu and zaibatsu, and 
Korean jaebol organizations). If one of the separate accounting units makes a loss, 
earnings from the profitable units are often reallocated to help out the loss-makers. That 
is, cross-subsidization serves as insurance against failure. 
3. When there is multi-level hierarchical control, leaders may have  reputational 
incentives to prevent financial failure.  In particular, a spectacular collapse on the part of 
a lower-level unit might suggest that higher-ups had failed to exercise proper control. 
Rescuing the troubled unit would help avoid the charge of managerial laxity (Bai and 
Wang, 1996).
9 
4. Sometimes rescuing a  BC-organization represents an effort by an S-organization to 
avoid  economic spillover effects. If a big enterprise goes under, its unpaid bills may 
force its suppliers down too, starting a chain reaction of bankruptcies. These failures 
could cause mass redundancies and a fall in aggregate demand, possibly leading 
                                                   
8 This paper reflects the three authors’ current shared conception of the SBC 
syndrome, in which a multiplicity of motives for bail out must figure for a 
comprehensive understanding.  Thus we see no value in, say, pitting the views in Kornai 
(1980) against those in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).  To the contrary, we believe a 
synthesis accommodating both views to be the most worthwhile approach.   
9 Motives 2 and 3 presume that the S-organization is hierarchically superior to the 
supported BC-organization.  The other motives do not entail any particular hierarchal 
relationship.   
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recession. This motivation for rescue is sometimes captured by the phrase, “Too big to 
fail.” It seems particularly important for the case of banks and other financial 
institutions on the brink of insolvency. Indeed, there have been occasions in economic 
history, including the great depression of the 1930’s, when spectacular bank failures 
seem to have been instrumental in precipitating panic and recessions. The financial 
collapse of social insurance institutions can also have grav e economic consequences. 
5. Finally, there may be  dishonest influences at work in the S -organization: “crony” 
relationships with the organization to be rescued, political pressure or plain bribery. 
Notice that we do not include insurance companies among S-organizations. In a 
commercial insurance transaction, the client  buys a “service” (through paying a 
premium) in which the insurer agrees to provide compensation in case of loss. But a 
BC-organization in a SBC relationship does not purchase rescue from the  S-
organization.
10 Indeed, the crux of the SBC problem is precisely that an S-organization 
would not  wish to commit itself contractually to provide support; its incentive to bail 
the BC-organization out arises only ex post. 
2.3  The Duration and Means of Support 
The terms “support” and “rescue” have been used up to now without specifying any 
temporal context. A rescue in everyday language is a single act, e.g. throwing a life belt 
to a drowning man. That is often the case in economic practice as well: an organization 
that has previously been viable finds itself in grave financial trouble and is kept alive by 
a single intervention. The SBC syndrome, however, is not limited to once-off rescues. It 
                                                   
10 Of course, there may be cases where a BC-organization seems to “buy” rescue by 
bribing the appropriate agent of the S-organization. But this is clearly not an insurance 
transaction.  The bribe cannot be viewed as a premium; it typically will fall far short of 
compensating the S -organization for the cost of the rescue effort (in any case, it 
typically goes straight into the bribed official’s pocket rather than into the S -
organization’s coffers).  
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also includes  prolonged support of organizations suffering from pe rsistent financial 
problems. Another analogy may be more appropriate here: a patient near death, hooked 
up to life-support machines and breathing apparatus, fed through tubes, with the heart-
beat electrically regulated. Long-term interventions of this kind are unquestionably part 
of the SBC syndrome. 
The means of rescue and sustenance fall into two main groups. The first consists 
of fiscal means, in the form of subsidies from the state budget or of tax concessions 
(remission, reduction, or postponement of tax obligations). 
The second group involves some form of credit. For example, loans may be 
offered to financially troubled firms that would not be eligible for credit were standard 
conservative lending criteria applied. Alternatively, firms that have already borrowed 
may have the servicing and repayment terms in their loan contracts relaxed. Of course, 
credit per se is consistent with an HBC.  But under the SBC syndrome too much credit 
is extended from the standpoint of economic efficiency. 
Trade credit is normal practice in both HBC and SBC settings: buyers are often 
not expected to pay sellers straightaway.  However, in the SBC world, a buyer can often 
get away with postponing payment beyond the agreed upon deadline.  
Actions that soften the budget constraint are often observable events, whose 
frequency and relative weight in financial affairs can be measured. Some indicators of 
softness are published in standard economic statistics. Observing and measuring other 
indicators is more complex and calls for special data collection. (See indicators 1– 4, 
forming the first block in Table 1.) 
Softening can often be disguised by being undertaken in parallel with measures 
that appear to go the other way. For instance, a government may sharply reduce the 
subsidies recorded in the state budget—such a change is obvious and welcome to the 
IMF and international observers— but concurrently relax fiscal discipline, and, in this 
way, provide financial support for loss-making firms. Similarly, when fiscal means of 
softening are restricted, credit methods may come to the fore, say, in the form of soft  
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loans (Bonin and Schaffer, 1995, Kornai 2001). Just as a drastic operation to remove a 
cancer in one organ may be followed by secondary tumors in other organs, so the 
symptoms of the SBC syndrome can move from one sphere to another. Such metastases 
have occurred repeatedly during the post-socialist transition, hence the need for caution 
when measuring the strength of the SBC syndrome via the means of softening. Simply 
observing one or two such measures can easily generate misleading conclusions. 
2.4  Expectations and the SBC Mentality 
If a bailout is entirely unanticipated there is little point in ascribing the event to 
an SBC. We normally say that the syndrome is truly at work only if organizations can 
expect to be rescued from trouble, and those expectations in turn affect their behavior. 
Such expectations have much to do with collective experience. The more frequently 
financial problems elicit support in so me part of the economy, the more organizations in 
that part of the economy will count on  getting support themselves. 
From time to time, S -organizations may announce that henceforth they will 
break with past practice and refrain from making bailouts. But, of course, such 
announcements normally have little effect unless combined with some institutional 
change that lends credibility to the promises.  If BC-organizations can see that an S -
organization has done nothing to modify its vested interest in lending support, they will 
simply ignore such vows. 
Naturally, it is not possible to observe expectations and states-of-mind directly, 
but an appropriate questionnaire may garner useful information about these. For 
instance, the head of a BC-organization could be asked what sort of financial trouble 
would force it to cease trading, or what chance he/she would see of a rescue (for these 
possibilities of measurement, see indicator 5, the second block in Table 1). 
To summarize, the SBC mentality is a basic feature of the SBC syndrome. The 
syndrome embraces not just a characteristic sequence of events and financial  
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transactions, but the states-of-mind of organization managers that give rise to those 
events. 
2.5  Primary Consequences: Survival and Exit 
The SBC syndrome exerts considerable influence over the life and death of 
organizations and thus over economic natural selection. Let us ignore categories (iv) 
and (v), from subsection 2.1: financial difficulties do not normally lead municipalities, 
towns and districts, let alone countries, to exit.  Within categories (i)–(iii), however, exit 
is a normal event. If an organization, particularly one in category (i) or (ii), makes 
persistent losses, an HBC environment will not permit its survival. 
A key measure of the SBC syndrome is the degree to which organizations are 
permitted to fail.  As a first approximation, one can examine the overall frequency of 
bankruptcies and liquidations.  More accurate conclusions can be drawn by limiting the 
exit proportion calculations to the organizations in serious financial difficulty—those 
likely to exit under an HBC (for these measurement possibilities, see indicators 6 –8 in 
the third block in Table 1). 
The SBC idea complements Schumpeter’s (1911) theory of creative destruction. 
Schumpeter’s main concern was to explain the birth of organizations, and the role 
played by entrepreneurs in generating entry; he tacitly assumed that the market takes 
care of death.  Indeed, even in good times, most market economies experience a 
significant rate of exit.  Theories of the SBC syndrome help illuminate the role of the S-
organizations in producing deviations from normal exit rates, by weakening or even 
eliminating the “destructive” aspect of the Schumpeterian process. 
2.6  Behavioral Effects of the Syndrome 
When BC-organizations anticipate being rescued should they get into trouble, 
their behavior is usually distorted. Let us examine some characteristic distortions.  
  14
Perhaps the most important is the attenuation of managerial effort to maximize 
profits, or, when there is no profit motive, to reduce costs. There is also a weakening of 
the drive to innovate and develop new technologies and products. Rather than wooing 
customers, sellers concentrate more on winning the favor of potential S-organizations
 11 
efforts from production or service provision to wooing organizations that may give 
assistance. All these effects reduce the efficiency of organizations affected by the SBC. 
The SBC syndrome dulls the price responsiveness of BC-organizations and 
thereby the effect of price signals. There is less need to attend to relative prices on the 
output or input side if the difference between revenue and expenditure is no longer 
critical. 
BC-organizations’ ability to buy inputs without footing the bill—costs are borne 
by S-organizations—can dramatically augment their demand for these inputs. This in 
turn can lead to serious shortages.  The SBC syndrome may also give an inordinate 
boost to the propensity to invest, by reducing the risk to the investor, who can anticipate 
assistance from the S -organization should the investment turn out poorly. Both 
phenomena—runaway demand and overinvestment in risky ventures—may lead to 
excessive economic expansion.
12 
To sum up, the SBC syndrome is a complex phenomenon that substantially 
al ters the selection processes operating in society and the economy, compared with their 
operation in a market framework.  It is driven by a characteristic set of motives, works 
through a characteristic set of means, and has characteristic effects on the expectations 
                                                   
11 This ambition resembles the managerial attitude customarily termed “rent-seeking” 
(Krueger, 1974). 
12 On the occasion of the Asian crisis, Krugman (1998) writes that “over guaranteed 
and under-regulated intermediaries can lead to excessive investment by the economy as 
a whole.” He offers a simple model of the effect of implicit guarantees to financial 
intermediaries, but does not set these ideas within the framework of the SBC-syndrome. 
Going farther, Huang and Xu (1999a) argue that the 1997/1998 crisis can indeed be 
traced to such a syndrome.  
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and behavior of actors.  All these features are empirically observable and measurable. 
That is, the extent to which an economy or sub-economy is subject to the SBC 
syndrome is a question that is in principle answerable.  
3. Theories of the SBC Syndrome 
Before beginning our theoretical review, we must make several preliminary 
remarks.  First we must stress that no available model analyzing the SBC captures all 
the characteristic features delineated in section 2.  In this sense, there does not exist a 
formal model that can be designated the theory of the SBC. The use of the plural, rather 
than the singular in the section title is meant to emphasize this.  
Each theory, even the most comprehensive, at best does what theoretical 
analyses of other complex social phenomena do, which is to pick out particular 
relationships; study them using rigorously defined concepts and precisely expressed 
assumptions; and arrive at certain logical conclusions. All this is done by abstracting 
away other relationships, explanatory factors, and consequences. 
Understanding the SBC syndrome entails bearing in mind a complex chain of 
causality, which has been depicted in a schematic form in Figure 1  (on next page). 
Block (1) represents the political, social and economic environment that generates the 
motives behind the formation of the SBC syndrome, for instance the classical, pre-
reform socialist system, or the post-socialist transition, or some variant of the capitalist 
system. Block (2) represents the motives that create the SBC syndrome. Finally Block 
(3) represents the effects that the SBC syndrome brings about. All three blocks have 







Figure 1. The SBC Syndrome: The Chain of Causality 
 
The formal theories below focus on Blocks (2) and (3), and the effects of Block 
(2) on Block (3). The implication (1) ﬁ (2) is usually touched on in these works, but 
not always with a detailed analysis. Some modelers have been inspired by a particular 
political-social-economic formation under Block (1), such as reform experiments within 
socialism or the post-socialist transition. In most cases, they have framed their papers 
and placed their models in this environment. Our survey follows this approach. We 
make no attempt to extend the models by generalizing them beyond the particular 
environments in which they are set. In section 4 we return to the interaction (1) ﬁ (2) 
when discussing the remaining research agenda. 
There is a fair amount of work that simply posits the existence of the SBC 
syndrome and concentrates on the effect (2) ﬁ (3). These papers do not address the 
question of why the budget constraint is soft. Rather they clarify how the softness of the 
budget constraint  – exogenously given—influences the working of the economy, e.g., 
how it modifies the form of the demand function  (e.g. Kornai and Weibull, 1983; 
Goldfeld and Quandt, 1988, 1990, 1993; Magee and Quandt, 1994, etc.). We think this 
approach has been useful, but do not deal with in section 3.  
3.1  The SBC as a Dynamic Commitment Problem 
As suggested in section 2, an important potential explanation for SBCs is the 
inability of the supporting organization (S-organization) to commit itself not to extend 
further credit to a budget-constrained organization (BC-organization) after providing 
initial financing.  The S-organization would like to induce the BC-organization to avoid 
making a loss.  So it declares that it will refuse to bail the firm out.  However, it fails to 





Motivation of the S-
Organization 
(3) 
Effects of the SBC 
Syndrome   
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Thinking of the problem as one of dynamic commitment leads one to consider 
the ex ante and ex post decisions of the S-organization.  The very term “soft budget 
constraint” suggests that the S-organization becomes willing to extend more money ex 
post to the BC-organization than it was prepared to provide ex ante.  This indicates that 
the ex post bailout money would be seen as wasteful beforehand.  We will show below 
that a wide spectrum of interpretations of the SBC syndrome can be understood and 
classified using this ex ante/ex post distinction. 
The first formal model to make the link between SBCs and dynamic 
commitment was that of Schaffer (1989).  The model works as follows13.  An enterprise 
manager chooses either to exert effort (costing him  e) on producing output or to 
withhold effort.  If he expends the effort, output is Y and he receives a bonus B for high 
output (so that his net payoff is B – e > 0).  If he does not expend effort, output is zero 
unless the center then undertakes to bail the enterprise out.  A bailout ensures that 
output is Y but costs the center R, where R < Y.  Suppose that the center is interested in 
maximizing output net of bailout costs.  Then, if the manager withholds effort, the 
center will opt for a bailout, since  Y  –  R > 0 and output otherwise would be 0.  
Anticipating this bailout, the manager will refrain from exertion, because, without 
effort, he still expects to collect his bonus but avoids the expenditure e.  In equilibrium, 
therefore, the manager will expend no effort, and the center will step in to create an 
SBC in the form of a bailout. 
This outcome can be viewed as a failure of commitment.  If the center could 
somehow tie its hands and commit itself not to undertake a bailout, it would fare better: 
the manager would now choose to exert effort (since B – e is bigger than 0), and the 
center would therefore enjoy output Y without expenditure R.  But notice that the center 
cannot simply announce in advance  that there will be no bailout.  Such an 
announcement would not be believed, since the manager knows that the center prefers a 
                                                   
13 Schaffer’s model was developed to address a variety of issues.  We present a 
simplified version that focuses on just the soft budget constraint.   
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payoff of Y – R to 0.  To induce the manager to expend effo rt, therefore, the manager 
must do something at the outset to make bailouts impossible or at least prohibitively 
costly. 
Although Schaffer (1989) connects SBCs to the issue of dynamic commitment, 
the paper leaves many questions unanswered.  One obviously important question is why 
the center has to play this game at all.  Since its intervention serves no useful purpose, 
one might ask why it cannot simply erect an insuperable bureaucratic barrier that 
prevents its playing any economic role in the enterprise.  Within the context of the 
model, this would completely solve the SBC problem. 
Another major unaddressed issue is why socialist and transitional economies 
seem to have been more vulnerable to SBCs than full-fledged market economics.  Put 
another way, why d on’t the S-organizations of capitalism bail out capitalist firms in the 
same way that the center in the Schaffer model does?   
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (henceforth DM) and the literature that 
developed from it attempt to answer these questions.  The s implest version of the 
Dewatripont-Maskin model comprises two periods, a center that serves as a source of 
financing, and a set of enterprises, each headed by a manager, that require funding to 
undertake projects.  At the beginning of period 1 each enterprise manager selects a 
“project” and decides whether or not to submit it for funding.  Projects are of two 
possible types: good (with probability a) and poor (with probability 1  - a).  Once a 
project is selected, its type is learned by the manager but not the center.  Thus there is 
asymmetric information. 
When a project is submitted, the center must decide in period 1 whether or not to 
fund it.  Set-up funding costs 1.  If funded, a good project yields a verifiable gross 
monetary return  ( ) 0 > g R  and a private benefit  ( ) 0 > g B  for the enterprise (the private 
benefit might include such things as managerial perquisites and reputation 
enhancement) by the beginning of period 2.  By contrast, a funded poor project yields a 
zero monetary return by the beginning of period 2.  Faced with a poor project, the center  
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could liquidate the enterprise’s assets, in which case it obtains a liquidation value 
( ) 0 ‡ L  and the enterprise gets a net private benefit  ) 0 (< L B  (representing, say the 
manager’s loss of reputation after liquidation).  The center alternatively could refinance 
the project by injecting additional capital of 1.  In this case, the gross return is 
) 0 (> p R and the manager’s benefit  ) 0 (> p B  at the end of period 2.  The decision to 
liquidate or refinance need not be a pure strategy; the center may choose to refinance  
with probability s and to liquidate with probability 1 – s.  The timing and structure of 
the model are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The Structure of the Dewatripont-Maskin Model 
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We will say that an enterprise with a poor project has a hard budget constraint if 
the center decides to liquidate it  ( ) 0 = s .  The enterprise’s budget constraint is  soft, 
however, if the center opts for refinancing  ( ) 1 = s .  More generally, when s is strictly 
between 0 and 1, it measures the degree to which the budget constraint is soft. 
The degree of softness in the enterprise’s budget constraint will influence the 
manager’s behavior, in particular his decision whether or not to submit a poor project.  
If we assume that all monetary returns go to the center (so that the manager’s payoff 
equals his private benefit), then the manager will submit a poor project if and only if 
( ) 0 1 ‡ - + L p B B s s , i.e. as long as 









Thus, there is a minimum degree of softness s  above which managers will submit poor 
projects. Notice that s  decreases with Bp and increases with  L B - . 
Up to this point we have assumed nothing about the center’s objectives and the 
conditions under which it will choose to finance projects ex ante and either liquidate or 
refinance poor projects ex post. Because the SBC syndrome was originally identified by 
Kornai (1980) for socialist economie s, let us begin by adopting assumptions appropriate 
for this case. Accordingly, assume that the center is the state and that the state 
maximizes  the overall social welfare from a project, which we will take to be the 
project’s net monetary return, plus the private benefit to enterprises, plus the external 
effect E of the  project on the rest of the economy. The last term might include such 
things as the political benefit of keeping project workers employed. As already noted, 
enterprise managers are assumed to be interested solely in their net private benefits. 
Notice that if we have 
  1 L p p p B L E B R + > - + +   (1)  
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(where Ep denotes the external effect of a poor project), the state will prefer to refinance 
a poor project and so will take s = 1.  We should emphasize that if inequality (1) holds, 
it does not follow that the project is efficient nor that the state would have chosen to go 
ahead with financing ex ante had it known the project was poor.  Indeed, a poor project 
is efficient only if its benefits (amounting to  p p p E B R + + ) outweigh its costs 
(amounting to 2). And the project is inefficient if 
1 1 - + + > p p p E B R .  (2) 
Observe that if (1) and (2) both hold, the center will choose to refinance a poor project, 
even though that project is inefficient and would not have been financed in the first 
place had its type been known.  The discrepancy arises because (2) represents an  ex ante 
criterion; by contrast, (1) is an  ex post criterion, one that arises after an investment of 1 
has already been sunk in the project.  Even though (ex ante) efficiency is the relevant 
criterion in deciding whether or not a project should be undertaken, it is no longer 
pertinent when the state decides whether to refinance or liquidate. 
The inconsistency between these ex ante and ex post criteria is at the heart of the 
SBC syndrome viewed as a dynamic commitment problem. If the state could credibly 
commit not to bail out poor projects, it would improve efficiency—a manager of an 
enterprise with a poor project would refrain from even submitting it for financing, since 
liquidation would earn him a negative payoff (Bp < 0).  But without such commitment, 
the state will end up refinancing poor projects, and so they will indeed be submitted  ex 
ante. 
Notice that the discrepency between criteria (1) and (2) boils down essentially to 
a project’s initial funding.  Specifically, this financing enters the center’s ex ante but not 
ex post calculations, since, once extended, it becomes a sunk cost for the center.  Hence, 
the SBC problem is not due to the socialist objective function that we have assumed for 
the center.  Indeed, we will see below why SBCs are confined neither to socialist 
economies nor to government-firm relationships.  Indeed, the interesting question in the  
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end is not why we observe  the SBC syndrome in socialist economies, but rather why 
such constraints are not more prevalent in capitalist economies. 
We must stress the importance of ex ante uncertainty in this model.  If the center 
could identify a poor project ex ante, it would decline to fund it.  However, because ex 
ante it cannot distinguish between good and poor projects, it will either finance all 
projects or none of them.  Projects will be financed if 
( ) ( )( ) ,   0 2 1 1 > - + + - + - + + p p p g g g E B R E B R a a  
i.e., if   
s
p p p g g g
P P P
E B R E B R
E B R a a ”
+ - - - + +




Thus, if  ,   and   1
s
L B L a a > < +  the only equilibrium of this model is one in which 
managers submit poor projects, all projects are funded, and all poor projects are 
refinanced  ( ) 1 = s , even though poor projects are ex ante inefficient.  We call this a soft 
budget constraint equilibrium.  Its opposite, a hard budget constraint equilibrium (which 
would prevail if inequality (1) were reversed) would entail that all poor projects be 
liquidated ex post.  Thus they would not be submitted by managers ex ante. 
From the standpoint of the DM model, “hardening” the budget constraint means 
creating conditions in which the center can credibly commit not to refinance an 
enterprise.  Note that the hardness of the budget constraint is not a matter of direct 
policy choice, but rather the indirect result of putting institutions in place that 
discourage or interfere with refinancing. 
As we indicated in section 2, the original analysis of soft budget constraints in 
Kornai (1980) was not mainly concerned with the causes of the SBC syndrome b ut 
rather with its consequences, especially the emergence of pervasive shortages.  To the 
extent that it dwelt on causes, it concentrated particularly on political considerations, 
e.g., the desire of a “paternalistic” state to avoid socially and politically costly layoffs.  
Our above rendition of the DM model is entirely consistent with this point of view—as  
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we have demonstrated, a paternalistic center (a center that maximizes “over-all” 
welfare) in that model may indeed give rise to an SBC.  Indeed, as we will see below, 
SBCs may be particularly likely when the center is paternalistic.  Logically, however, 
the model shows that paternalism is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
SBCs.  The crux of the story is lack of dynamic commitment, which  could arise with 
paternalism but also with many other possible motivations on the part of the center. 
We will now review some of the ways the Dewatripont-Maskin model in 
subsection 3.1 has been extended and adapted to shed light on a variety of SBC 
phenomena. 
3.2 The SBC in Socialist Economies 
3.2.1 Shortage 
Kornai (1980) cited the phenomenon of widespread shortages as one of the most 
important consequences of the SBC syndrome in socialist economies.  Building on the 
model of subsection 3.1, Qian (1994) proposes a mechanism for how shortages might 
come about.  In effect, Qian suggests that a shortage may be a device—albeit a very 
costly one—to reduce the benefits of refinancing poor projects and thereby eradicate, or 
at least to mitigate, soft budget constraints.   
Consider the model of subsection 3.1 but assume now that in period 2, 
enterprises with poor projects, if refinanced, use this additional funding to purchase an 
input that is also in demand by consumers (the conclusions of the analysis would not be 
al tered if enterprises with good projects also bought this input).  Assume that this input 
is inelastic supply x .  Without SBC and thus no refinancing of poor projects, consumers 
will pay a market-clearing price  ( ) x v p = , where  () ￿ v  is the inverse demand function.  
When poor projects are refinanced, however, consumer demand can be crowded out.  
Assume that one unit of input is needed to complete a poor project.  The market -
clearing price will then be  )) 1 ( (
* a n - - = n x p , where n is the total number of projects  
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(we are invoking the law of large numbers to express the number of poor projects as 
( ) a - 1 n ).  Thus the cost of refinancing will be p
* which is larger than p.  But, as long as 
L p p p B L p E B R + > - + +
* , the SBC syndrome will persist. 
In this model SBCs impose a double burden on society: the usual loss from 
propping up an inefficient project plus higher prices for consumers.  Qian shows, 
however, that placing a cap on the input price—thereby creating a shortage and the need 
for rationing (which Qian assumes is implemented probabilistically)—may serve to help 
mitigate these ill effects.  Suppose that the cap is set so that, if refinancing is not sought 
for any other poor project, an enterprise with a poor project receives the input with 
probability  q and does not receive it (i.e., the enterprise is rationed) with probability 
1  –  q, in which case the project is liquidated. Then the expected payoff for the 
enterprise’s manager is  ( ) L p B q qB - + 1 , which is negative for  q sufficiently small.  
Hence for a sufficiently low price cap (implying a low q), the manager will be deterred 
from submitting a poor project, and the SBC will thus vanish.  Of course, consumers too 
now face rationing—which itself is inefficient—but, for a large range of parameter 
values, this will be preferable to their being crowded out by inefficient projects. 
3.2.2 Innovation 
The failure to innovate—to develop new technology at a sufficient pace—was a 
major reason for the ultimate collapse of central planning in the former Soviet Union 
and other socialist economies.  Qian and Xu (1998) argue that this failure was directly 
related to the SBC syndrome.  Because of soft budget constraints, centrally planned 
economies lack the capacity to screen out poor R&D projects ex post, i.e., after these 
projects’ prospects are known (by contrast with market economies, which—for reasons 
we will discuss in later subsections—have harder budget constraints and therefore can 
screen  ex post).  Therefore, they have to rely on  ex ante screening, which is less 
effective.  
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Following Qian and Xu (1998), we can formalize the argument as follows.  
Suppose, as before, that the center does not know at the outset whether an R&D project 
is good or poor.  Assume, however, that perhaps by consulting experts, the center can 
acquire a signal about the project’s type (pre-screening).  Prescreening is imperfect: it 
labels poor projects correctly but may mistakenly mislabel a good project as poor (to 
simplify the argument, we assume that only type II errors are possible).  Nevertheless, if 
SBCs are a problem, the center may well avail itself of prescreening, which eliminates 
poor projects but also reduces the number of good projects, and hence induces a lower 
rate of innovation than in an economy with HBCs. 
Prescreening of R&D projects—which was intensely employed in the former 
Soviet Union—will of course, work better if the number of mislabeled good projects is 
low.  This is more likely to be the case when prior technological knowledge is good (as 
was the case in the Soviet aerospace industry in the period 1950-1980), and less likely 
when the relevant science is in its infancy (as was the case in the computer industry at 
that time).  Thus, the model predicts—and experience bears out—that the innovation 
“gap” between economies with soft and hard budget constraints should be greater for 
technologies where the corresponding science is newer. 
3.2.3 The Ratchet Effect 
The term “ratchet effect” was coined by Berliner (1952) in his analys is of 
management behavior in Soviet-style firms.  In such firms, managers were given what 
appeared to be strong incentives to fulfill their production plans.  Indeed, they had 
inducements to  over-fulfill the plans: each percentage point over the target was 
rewarded by additional bonuses.  Nevertheless, managers tended to pass up the 
opportunity for these bonuses and instead were conservative in their plan over-
fulfillment, rarely exceeding 2% over target.  Berliner’s explanation for this 
conservatism was that managers feared that next year’s target would be “ratcheted 
up”—made more demanding—if they exceeded this year’s goal.  By producing at 110% 
instead of 102%, their bonus would be higher today, but so would their target tomorrow.   
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Models of the “ratchet effect” in Soviet planning include Weitzman (1980), Keren et al. 
(1983), Bain et al. (1987), and Roland and Szafarz (1990). 
Like the SBC syndrome, the ratchet effect is not confined to socialist economies.  
Other manifestations include a corporate division scrambling to spend money to prevent 
its budget from being cut, and workers on the assembly line slowing down their pace to 
forestall getting higher workloads tomorrow.  Treatments of the ratchet effect as a more 
general dynamic commitment problem include Freixas et al. (1985), Laffont and Tirole 
(1988, 1993) and Litwack (1993).   
The ratchet effect and the SBC syndrome are clearly conceptually related.  They 
also have the potential for reinforcing each other.  To see this, let us follow Dewatripont 
and Roland (1997) and modify the model of section 3.1 so that good projects, as well as 
poor, generate a return in period 2 if refinanced.  Assume furthermore that second-
period financing derives entirely from first-period returns.  Finally, suppose that by 
exerting effort, a manager with a good project can increase the second-period gross 
return and externality by the amount 
( ) 0 ˆ ˆ > + - + g g g g E R E R   (3) 
and increase the private benefit by the amount  , ˆ
g g B B -  where 
.   ˆ e B B g g > -   (4) 
Formulas (3) and (4) imply that the manager’s exertions are socially desirable. Assume, 
however, that 
. ˆ ˆ ˆ
g g g p p p E B R E B R + + > + +   (5) 
Formula (5) implies that, given a choice, the center will give higher priority to 
refinancing poor projects than refinancing good projects, and so good projects may be 
crowded out.  Specifically, if there is an SBC, the gross return from the first period is 
g R a  per project (as opposed to  Rg under an HBC).  Hence, only  ( ) a a - - 1 g R  is 
available for good projects (whereas there is ample capital to refinance all good projects  
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under an HBC).  Thus, if 
g R
1







a a g R
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good project will be refinanced.  If managers are risk neutral and 













they will be  discouraged from exerting effort.  This sort of deleterious cross-
subsidization—in which proceeds from good projects refinance poor projects, thereby 
attenuating the good projects’ returns—is conceptually similar to the ratchet effect.  It 
also proved to be an intractable problem for the former Soviet Union. 
3.2.4 Enterprise Autonomy 
A hallmark of the attempted reforms of socialism undertaken in Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, Poland and Russia was greater enterprise autonomy.  The rationale was that 
by delegating decision-making authority, the center would promote better decisions, 
since enterprise managers are likely to have the best information about local conditions.  
It became apparent in retrospect, however, that increased enterprise autonomy led to a 
softening of budget constraints. 
Within the framework of the model presented in subsection 3.1, it is not difficult 
to see how this softening may have come about.  Specifically, following Wang (1991), 
assume that the center monitors enterprises ex ante and can detect with probability p 
whether or not a project is poor.  This means that a proportion (1 -p)(1 -a) of projects 
will be subject to bailout.  Increased autonomy may well entail a more limited ability of 
the center to monitor and hence a reduction in  p.  But lower p means that more poor 
projects get refinanced, i.e., SBCs are more pronounced. 
Still, we ought not conclude that weakening the center’s ability to monitor 
unambiguously softens enterprises’ budget constraints, as Debande and Friebel (1995) 
emphasize.  Suppose, for example, that a poor project’s gross return  Rp is  random.  
Then only for those realizations of the project’s return for which (1) holds will  
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refinancing occur.  Now, with greater enterprise autonomy, the center may no longer be 
able to discern the exact realization of Rp but only its mean.  But although it is quite 
possible that (1) may hold for many realizations of Rp, it may well fail to hold for the 
mean—in which case SBCs will vanish. 
3.3  The SBC in Transitional Economies 
A recurrent theme in discussions about transforming an economy from a 
socialist to a market mode of operation is the need to harden budget constraints of both 
enterprises and banks.  Ironically, the transition experience suggests that constraints 
have only become softer amongst the economies of Eastern Europe in the initial phases 
of their transition.  Nevertheless, theory suggests that there are some steps that might be 
taken to help root out the SBC syndrome. 
3.3.1 Devolution 
Qian and Roland (1998) investigate devolution of government as a method for 
hardening budget constraints.  The inspiration for this study was the Chinese 
experience.  For obvious political reasons, privatization was not an acceptable option in 
China at the beginning of the transition process.  Nevertheless, there was a significant 
reorganization of government, in particular a decentralization of fiscal authority from 
Beijing to regional governments. Qian and Roland argue that competition among 
regional governments to attract foreign capital led to harder budget constraints.  The 
following is a rendition of their analysis. 
As in the model of subsection 3.1, assume that there are enterprises—in this 
case, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—that draw good projects with probability a and 
poor projects with probability 1 - a.  There are also foreign firms, which make capital 
investments Ki  in each region  N i , , 1K = .  Region i’s output is given by f (Ki,Ii), where 
Ii is public infrastructure in region i financed by government.  The production function f 
satisfies standard assumptions:    
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Government and foreign firms are, in effect, partners in a joint venture and divide 
output accordingly.  Let b be the share accruing to government.  Suppose that the total 
amount of foreign capital, K, is fixed. 
Government’s revenue comes from taxing the SOEs.  Revenue is spent for three 
purposes: to bail out SOEs (in the case of SBCs), to invest in infrastructure, and to 
provide public goods.  If these expenditures are all determined by the central 
government (and foreign firms choose their Ki ’s as optimal responses to the Ii’s), they 
will be chosen to maximize 
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,   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ £ + + i i i i T z y I   (9) 
 
where, for all  i,  yi is e xpenditure on bailing out SOEs in region  i,  zi is expenditure on 
public goods in region  i, and Ti is tax revenue available form SOEs in region i (in this 
program, we treat the Ki’s as if they are choice variables for the government because we 
also impose (7) and (8), which ensure that, at the optimum, the Ki’s will have the same  
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values as though chosen by the foreign firms).  Observe that there will be SBCs (i.e., yi 
> 0) provided that, in the solution to this program, we have 
( ) ( ),   , 1 i i i
i
L p p p z u I K
I
f
B L E B R ¢ =
¶
¶
> - - - + + b   (10) 
i.e., if the marginal benefit from refinancing poor projects,  1 - - - + + L p p p B L E B R , 








b ,which, at the optimum, must 
equal the marginal benefit from public goods  ( ) i z u¢ . 
If, however, the expenditure decisions are devolved to the regional government, 
then, for all i = 1,…,N, the optimization problem becomes that of maximizing 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i i L p p i i i z u y B L B R I I K f + - - - + + 1 , b   (11) 
such that 
,   i i i i T z y I £ + +   (12) 
where we have written  Ki as a function of  Ii  in (11) to reflect the fact that foreign 
investment in region i will adjust to Ii so as to satisfy 
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In this case, the condition needed for an SBC becomes 






















> - - - + + b   (14) 
But notice that (14) is more stringent than (10) because  










That is, the marginal value of infrastructure investment is higher for a regional 
government than for a central government because additional infrastructure in region i     
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lures foreign investors away from other regions, a consideration that is pertinent to the 
regional but not the central government.  As competition amongst regional governments 
raises the marginal value of investment, the relative attractiveness of bailing out failing 
SOEs declines and so hardens the budget constraint.  This hardening, however, comes at 
a cost: competition induces excessive infrastructure investment.  This cost must be 
taken into account when assessing the implications of devolution. 
It is worth emphasizing that the above argument concerns the hardening of 
enterprises’ budget constraints through devolution.  Decentralization of government 
does not, however, necessarily harden the budget constraints of regional governments.  
Indeed, just the opposite may occur: giving regional governments discretion o ver 
expenditure allows them to distort the composition of this expenditure in the hope of 
attracting funding from the central government (see Qian and Roland (1998) for further 
details). 
3.3.2 Privatizing Banks 
The foregoing models amply illustrate the proposition that hardening budget 
constraints is not a matter of direct policy choice but rather the indirect outcome of 
institutional changes in the relationship between funding sources and enterprises.  So far 
we have supposed that enterprises are financed and refinanced by a government that 
cares not only about the financial return ( R)  on its investment but “overall social 
welfare” (as modeled by R + B + E). 
Let us now examine the implication of having firms financed by a private bank.  
Such a bank would presumably be in the business of maximizing profit rather than 
social welfare.  In that case, the condition for refinancing is transformed from (1) to 
.   1 L Rp > -   (15) 
Notice that if 
, 0 > - + L p p B E B   (16)  
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then condition (15) is more demanding than (1), in which case privatization serves to 
harden budget constraints.  Furthermore,  0 ‡ p B  and  0 £ L B , and so unless Ep is highly 
negative, the budget constraint will indeed be harder with a private bank, a point made 
by Li (1992) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993).  This is an illustration of the well-
known idea that ex ante efficiency can sometimes be improved if the thereat of ex post 
inefficiency is introduced.  In this case, the potential inefficiency results from the fact 
that the bank maximizes its own profit rather than social welfare. 
Note, however, that even though SBCs may be jeopardized by privatization, they 
need not be eliminated altogether—(15) may still hold.  Indeed, there is at least one 
reason why (15) may be p articularly likely to hold in transitional economics: the 
liquidation value L may be low owing to limited private wealth and poorly functioning 
markets for liquidated assets.   
Besides having higher liquidation values, full-fledged market economies have 
two other features that serve to limit SBCs more effectively than in socialist or 
transitional economies: competition and decentralization.  In subsection 3.4 we explore 
this theme. 
3.3.3 Arrears and Redeployment  
We now introduce interactions between enterprises to explore the issue of trade 
arrears and their relationship to SBCs.  Trade debt has been an important phenomenon 
since the early days of transition.  After price liberalization, many firms became 
insolvent and could not pay their suppliers, so that  payment arrears began to 
accumulate.  In effect, clients were borrowing from their suppliers, which were 
themselves brought into financial difficulty as a result.  So many firms were affected 
that banks felt constrained to bail large numbers of them out to avoid generalized 
insolvency. 
The SBCs that arise when enterprises are linked together is an issue studied by 
Perotti (1993) and Coricelli and Miles-Ferretti (1993).  Suppose that enterprises with 
poor projects have the option of restructuring (i.e., making their projects “good”), which  
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requires effort on the part of managers, but no outside investment (see Grosfeld and 
Roland, (1997), for more on restructuring).  Let q be the proportion of enterprises 
exercising this option.  Of poor projects that are not restructured, let l be the proportion 
that are liquidated.  Then, a proportion (1 - a) (1 - q) l of all projects are liquidated.  To 
capture the possibility of interaction among projects, assume that healthy enterprises—
those with good or restructured projects—have supplier-customer relationships with 
those with poor projects.  Specifically, suppose that the return on their projects 
decreases in proportion w to the proportion of liquidated projects in the total number of 
















This interaction creates a problem for the bank: a tough liquidation policy will spill over 
to healthy firms, causing their financial situation to deteriorate and therefore worsening 
the bank’s own situation.  The bank’s expected profit as a function of q and l is given 
by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) [ ] .   1 1 1 1 1 1 , - - - + - - - + - + = P p g R w L R l l q a q a a q l
 
The negative spillover of liquidation has the effect of reducing the liquidation value of a 
loan from  L to  L  -  w.  Hence, budget constraints will be softened: the criterion for 
refinancing a poor project becomes 
.   1 w L R p - > -  
That is, the stronger the trade links between firms with different projects, the softer the 
bank will be.  By bailing out poor projects, the bank makes it possible for suppliers with 
healthy projects to be paid.  But, of course, this softness also lowers an enterprise’s 
incentive to restructure.  
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3.4  The SBC in a Competitive Environment 
We now turn to the issue of SBCs in market economies.  Most of the models that 
follow are drawn from papers that leave the overall political and economic environment 
unspecified. The simplest interpretation is that both the BC-organizations and the S -
organizations are operating in the competitive environment of a market economy, and 
this interpretation is reflected in the title of the subsection. However, the possibility that 
the situations portrayed in these models may also occur under other circumstances—
e.g., in a reform-socialist or a transitional economy —is not excluded. 
3.4.1. Competition Across Enterprises. 
As Segal (1998) argues, demonopolization of an industry may itself help harden 
budget constraints.  To see how this may happen, let us modify the basic Dewatripont-
Maskin model by supposing that an enterprise can be broken up i nto pieces that 
compete with one another.  In line with traditional industrial organization, assume 





n dRp , where  n is the number of enterprises in the industry and Rp(n) is 
the return on capital to a poor project if there are n enterprises (hence,  1 ) 1 ( > = p p R R ).  
If enterprises are financed and refinanced by a private bank, then the number of 
enterprises being bailed out ns satisfies Rp(ns) = 1.  Thus if there are N enterprises that 
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(the absolute values of Bp and  BL may be affected by N, but we assume that the ratio 
 Bp  ⁄ BL is unaffected), then enterprises drawing poor projects will choose not to submit 
them—the expected payoff from doing so would be negative.  Notice that making N  
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larger induces hardening of the budget constraint not because the bank’s incentive to 
bail out has changed—indeed, this incentive remains the same—but rather because  N 
credibly limits the fraction of enterprises that will be bailed out. 
The Segal (1998) model points to a general trade-off between excess capacity 
and HBCs.  It has long been a tenet of the industrial organization literature that, if setup 
is costly, there will be too many enterprises—i.e., more than the efficient number—in a 
free-entry equilibrium (see, for example, Mankiw and Whinston (1986)).  As we have 
observed, however, a potentially important compensatory effect of those “excessive” 
numbers is a hardening of the budget constraint. 
3.4.2 Entry of New Projects 
Following Berglöf and Roland (1998), we next study what happens when new 
projects can enter and compete for funding with old projects.  This entails adding an 
additional period—period 0 —before period 1. 
Suppose that a (private) bank finances projects at the beginning of period 0.  
Managers with poor projects must decide whether or not to submit them, taking into 
account the prospect of future bailouts.  At the beginning of period 1, there is an influx 
of new projects.  Hence, the bank must decide how to use the proceeds from period 0 
investment—to finance new projects or to refinance poor projects (assume that there are 
more new projects than funds to finance them).  Like their counterparts in period 0, 
managers with poor projects in period 1 must choose whether or not to submit them.  In 
period 2, the bank must decide whether or not to refinance the poor projects from period 
1 (using revenue generated from good projects in period 1).  If projects are refinanced, 
they realize their returns at the end of period 2. 
Given that Rp > 1, the bank has the incentive to refinance poor projects in period 
2.  Anticipating this, managers with poor projects will indeed submit them for funding 
in period 1.  The expected net return to the bank from a new project financed in period 1 
is therefore  
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( ) ( )( ), 2   1 1 - - + - p g R R b b   (17) 
where b is the proportion of new projects that are good (b need not equal a). 
Consider the bank’s financing decision in period 1.  If the bank opts to refinance 
existing projects before making new loans, managers with poor projects will submit 
them in period 0.  Hence the bank’s return from that refinancing is  
.   1 - p R   (18) 






p g R R
b b   (19) 
the bank will prefer new projects, and so old projects will not be refinanced after all.  
That is, an HBC applies to the period 0 projects if and only if (19) holds.  We conclude 
that the higher the average quality of the new cohort of projects, the harder the budget 
constraint for old projects. 
This result may shed additional light on why SBCs have been a more persistent 
problem in transitional economies than in advanced industrialized economies (we 
already discussed this question in subsection 3.3.2).  In the transitional economies of 
Eastern Europe, the average quality of new enterprise projects has been low, by 
comparison with that in advanced economies.  Thus, banks may have preferred 
refinancing old projects, thereby perpetuating SBCs. Conversely, entry helps explain 
why the  SBC phenomenon is not more widespread in advanced industrialized 
economies: vigorous entry by firms w ith high expected returns may make it less 
attractive for banks to refinance old loans rather than to invest in these very profitable 
projects, thereby hardening budget constraints for existing firms. 
An immediate corollary of the analysis is that fewer new projects will be 
financed in period 1 if period 0 enterprises have SBCs.  This result is notable because 
findings by Dittus (1994) and others that, early in the transition process, banks had 
drastically cut the allocation of credit to enterprises led some observers to argue that  
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budget constraints had been hardened.  The Berglöf-Roland model reveals that, to the 
contrary, the credit crunch may have been induced by a softening of budget constraints. 
3.4.3 Decentralized Banks 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue that decentralization of credit serves as a 
mechanism for hardening budget constraints.  Specifically, they show that if credit is 
dispersed, so that refinancing an enterprise requires funds from an outside bank, 
inefficiencies in bargaining between b anks may make refinancing unprofitable.  The 
idea is that the bank that makes the initial loan may not have the funds to refinance a 
poor project.  Thus, at least one additional creditor is required.  However, the initial 
bank is likely to have an informational advantage over the new creditor.  This 
asymmetry creates an inefficiency, reducing the return from refinancing and making 
liquidation more attractive. 
More formally, suppose that the ultimate return from a poor project depends on 
the (unobservable) e ffort level  a exerted by the initial bank (this effort can be 
interpreted as the resources that the bank devotes to monitoring).  Specifically, assume 
that the financial return of a refinanced poor project is  p R  with probability a and 0 with 
probability 1  – a.  Let the bank’s cost of a  be  ( ) a Y , where  ( ) ￿ Y  is increasing and 
convex. 
In this setting, centralized credit means that if a poor project is refinanced, the 
initial bank will do it.  Thus, the bank will fully internalize the benefit of monitoring in 
choosing its effort level: 
( ) { },   max a R a R p
a
C
p Y - =   (20) 
with first order condition 
( ).  
C
p a R Y¢ =   (21) 
Provided that  
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,   1 >
C
p R   (22) 
therefore, the bank will indeed refinance the poor project. 
If the initial bank is liquidity constrained—as might be the case if credit is 
sufficiently dispersed—a new creditor may have to be brought in for a project to be 
refinanced.  The new creditor cannot observe the effort level that the initial bank 
exerted, and so must form a conjecture  a ˆ .  If there is competition among potential 




 (for its loan of 1) if the poor project is successful (if the poor project is not 
successful, there is no money for repayment).  That is, the creditor anticipates a return 
of  1
ˆ
1 ˆ = ￿
a
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Because, in equilibrium, the conjectured  â must equal the actual effort level, the 
equilibrium effort level 
D a under decentralization satisfies the first-order condition 
( ).   1 D
D p a
a
R Y¢ = -   (23) 
Hence,  




p a R a R Y - - =   (24) 
 




p R R >  and so even if (22) holds, we may well 
have 
,   1 <
D
p R   (25)  
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in which case the project will not be refinanced
14. 
In view of (22) and (25), we conclude that decentralization of credit may serve 
to harden enterprises’ budget constraints.  The mech anism at work in the particular 
model presented is a liquidity constraint ; the initial bank cannot refinance the poor 
project out of its own funds.  Alternatively, risk aversion on the part of the bank will 
deliver the same conclusion.  That is, if decentralization leads banks to adopt 
undiversified portfolios (and, as we will note in a moment, there is reason to think that 
this may happen), then banks will be risk averse (relative to a centralized creditor with 
less highly correlated risks). This means that a bank that has already lent money to a 
poor project may find refinancing too risky to undertake—in which case the same logic 
we saw above would come into play. Thus, sufficient risk aversion can serve as a 
credible commitment against refinancing, and a  bank may deliberately choose an 
undiversified portfolio to ensure that it attains this risk aversion. 
Both liquidity constraints and risk aversion are most plausible when projects are 
large relative to the initial bank’s total holdings.  But other papers,  including Pavel 
(1995) and Huang and Xu (1998), explore how decentralization may produce HBCs 
when projects need not be big. 
Pavel (1995) examines a model in which a project is financed from the outset by 
two banks.  In effect, an HBC arises through a war of attrition between the investors.  
Suppose that an agreement on a restructuring plan is necessary to refinance a poor 
                                                   
14 Note that if instead  1 >
D
p R , decentralization of credit appears to be worse than 
centralization, since poor projects will now be refinanced but not monitored with 
sufficient effort.  However, this poor performance of decentralization compared with 
centralized credit is an artifact of the assumption that the former entails that the bank’s 
liquidity  constraint be binding.  If instead, following Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), 
we allowed liquidity to be determined endogenously in a decentralized credit market, 
we would conclude that if  1 >
D
p R , there is no difference in performance between 
centralization and decentralization.  
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project and that each bank’s assessment of the continuation value of the project is 
private information.  The asymmetric information between banks can give rise to a 
delay in their negotiating an acceptable restructuring plan.  However, if the value of the 
project declines over time, this delay may render refinancing unprofitable. 
Huang and Xu (1998) study a related model in which two banks (investors) 
agree to lend jointly to a project precisely because they have conflicting interests 
concerning how the project should be organized should it be refinanced.  Specifically, 
assume that each investor i,  i = 1,2, observes a private real-valued signal  si about 
reorganization.  Suppose that, in case of refinancing, the project could be completed 
either according to plan A or plan B.  However, which plan will actually succeed 
depends on the investors’ signals: if  2 1 s s >  then plan A is the right choice, whereas B 
is indicated if  2 1 s s < .  Suppose that the investors have arranged matters so that the 
difference between investor 1’s gross payoffs (i.e., the payoffs before any  ex post 
transfer) from plans B and A is increasing in s1, while the difference between investor 
2’s gross payoffs from plans A and B is increasing in  s2.  Then it is easy to show that 
there is  no mechanism that ensures the correct choice between A and B.  To see this 
intuitively, note that there is an inherent conflict between investors’ incentives and 
making the right choice: as s1 rises, plan A grows more likely to be the right option, but 
investor 1’s preference for plan B strengthens.  Thus, eliciting the signal value from 
investor 1 becomes more difficult.  By purposely ensuring that they have different 
information, the banks may be able to commit themselves not to refinance a project that 
they have jointly invested in15.   
Huang and Xu apply this argument to illuminating the East Asian crisis of the 
late 1990’s.  They note that the Korean jaebols were subject to centralized financing and 
suffered from lack of financial discipline and SBCs.  By contrast, Taiwan’s economy 
was characterized by dispersed financial institutions and decentralized banking.  In the 
                                                   
15 This logic is reminiscent of the literature on using contracts as a barrier to entry 
(see Aghion and Bolton (1987)).  
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event, Taiwan suffered much less from the crisis than Korea (even though it too was 
attacked by speculators).  By embedding their SBC model in a framework that includes 
bank runs, Huang and Xu account for both the East Asian “miracle” and its crisis.  The 
idea is that in an economy where innovation consists mainly of imitation, there will be 
high bank liquidity and high growth when the proportion of poor projects is sufficiently 
low, regardless of whether budget constraints are soft or hard.  But when the proportion 
rises above a certain level, then the economy is vulnerable to bank runs unless budget 
constraints are hard.  This is because  SBCs promote poor projects, and a poor project 
increases the general cost of borrowing on the interbank lending marke t, which 
normally serves as a counterweight to bank runs.  Therefore, an increase in  SBCs 
promotes bank runs.  Notice that this logic has little to do with the transparency or 
regulation of the interbank lending market, the issues that received most attention in the 
debate about the East Asian crisis. 
We have been discussing models in which a multiplicity of creditors make 
refinancing more difficult.  This is a theme, however that reaches well beyond the 
literature that invokes the term “soft budget constraints.”  Some of the papers outside 
that literature include Bolton and Scherfstein (1995), Berglöf and von Thadden (1994), 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Hart and Moore (1995). 
Although an HBC has positive incentive efforts, it can also induce “short-
termism” among managers with good projects, as von Thadden (1995) and Dewatripont 
and Maskin (1995) argue.  To see this, modify the model of subsection 3.1 so that 
managers with good projects can choose between a “quick” outcome yielding return Rg 
and private benefit Bg after one period or a “slow” outcome yielding 0 after one period 
but, with an additional infusion of capital,  Rs and  Bs by the second period, where 
g s g s B B R R > - > -   and   1 2 .  Notice that the slow option is more profitable than the 
quick one, but that, at the end of period 1, it cannot be distinguished from a poor 
project.  
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With an SBC, poor projects will be refinanced but so will slow (good) projects.  
By contrast, with an HBC, only quick projects will be refinanced.  If the high 
profitability of the slow projects sufficiently outweighs the inefficiency of the poor 
projects, an SBC may therefore be desirable.  In other words, by promoting only quick 
(i.e., short-term) projects, a hard budget constraint equilibrium sacrifices the potentially 
higher gains from long-term projects. 
This reasoning bears on the contrast between the Anglo-Saxon and 
German/Japanese financial systems.  In the 1980’s, the idea was put forward that 
market-oriented corporate finance, as practiced in the U.K. and U.S., can be “short-
termist” (Corbett, 1987), compared to the bank-based system of Germany and Japan, 
which provides more long-run finance and liquidity to firms (but also suffers from more 
poor projects).  Thus, the U.K./U.S. system can be viewed as corresponding to HBCs; 
the German/Japanese system to SBCs. 
The analysis changes somewhat if we allow for entry, as in the Berglöf and 
Roland (1998) model.  Dewatripont and Roland (2000) show that, although the HBCs 
induced by decentralized credit may promote short-termism, they may also serve to 
mobilize financial resources quickly for financing new innovations.  Assume, to 
simplify matters, that one unit of capital is exogenously available for financing at both 
period 0 and 1.  Suppose that the new projects available in period 1 are homogenous 
with return Rn.  Finally, assume that 









p R R   and    are the return to a poor project under decentralization and 
centralization as given by (24) and (20), respectively, and Rs is the return from a “slow” 
project.  Notice that the second inequality in (26) implies that, under centralization, 
there will be no funds in period 1 to finance new projects: all money will be allocated to 
refinancing slow and poor projects since the opportunity cost Rn of refinancing is lower 
than its benefit 
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p s R R R < - - + 1 1 a a   (27) 
this allocation will be inefficient ex ante: the ex ante return from new projects is higher 
than that from period 0 projects.  By contrast, the first inequality i n (26) implies that 
poor and slow projects would not be refinanced if credit is decentralized.  Hence, under 
decentralization, managers with good projects will elect the quick option, those with 
poor projects will not seek funding for them, and new projects will be financed. 
The Dewatripont-Roland argument suggest that a decentralized financial 
system—as in the U.S.—may be better able to respond to rapid technological change 
than the more centralized bank-oriented systems of Germany and Japan, which 
emphasize long-run risk-taking. 
3.4.4 Ex ante Screening 
Although most of the literature emphasizes how the dispersion of capital hardens 
budget constraints, there are cases where larger banks can more easily commit to 
terminate projects.  For example, in their (1997) model, Berglöf and Roland show that, 
if a bank is big enough, it can afford to invest in screening activities that allow it to 
reject some poor projects at the outset and also some of the new poor projects in period 
1.  The latter effect enhances the attractiveness of funding new projects and so hardens 
the budget constraint for those begun in period 0.  A similar argument is made by 
Schnitzer (1999), who emphasizes that the screening benefits of bigness may be 
particularly important in transition economies. 
If, however, there are complementarities between the activities of screening and 
monitoring (in the extreme case, if the same investment that permits screening also 
makes monitoring possible), then there will be a tension between enhanced screening 
(which improves the mix of funded projects) and enhanced monitoring (which makes 
refinancing more attractive and hence softens the budget constraint).  If the second 
effect is strong enough, banks may rationally choose to refrain from screening—and the 
potential advantage of larger banks vanishes.  In a similar vein, Faure-Grimand (1996) 
shows that when a regulated firm relies on the stock-market for financing, then the  
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additional scrutiny provided by the market may raise the probability of a bailout and so 
weaken the firm manager’s incentives—a syndrome often witnessed in transitional 
economies. 
3.5  The SBC in Banks 
The discussion so far has concerned models (or more precisely, institutional 
interpretations of models) in which the BC-organizations are enterprises and the 
rescuers (the S -organizations) a state and/or a bank. We now turn to another set of 
circumstances, in which the BC-organizations are banks and the role of S-organization 
is played by somebody else, such as a state or a central bank. Situations in which banks 
face SBCs are by no means confined to transitional economies.  In recent years we have 
witnessed the 1980’s S&L bailout in the U.S., the early 1990’s bailout of the Swedish 
and Finnish banking system, and the late 90’s bailout of banks in Asia. 
3.5.1 Bank Passivity and Gambling for Resurrection 
Mitchell (1997) analyzes the phenomenon of bank passivity, in which a bank 
fails to liquidate poor projects because it anticipates being bailed out by the government 
if it gets into difficulty.  The bank can either refinance the loan to a poor project or 
liquidate it.  The expected financial return from rolling over is negative, but the 
possibility of bailout serves as downside insurance.  Thus the bank has the incentive to 
gamble on a project’s “resurrection”: the bank benefits from the upside of such a 
decision and does not suffer the consequences of the downside.  To prevent such 
gambling, the government may try to monitor the bank. 
Formally, take the model of subsection 3.1 and suppose that, if refinancing 
occurs, the return from a poor project is either  p R  (with probability  q) or 0 (with 
probability 1 - q).  Assume too that the government can become an active player by 
monitoring the bank (to determine whether the bank is liquidating poor projects or not).  
The government decides ex ante on a detection probability D at a cost C(D).  Detection  
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occurs after the bank decides whether or not to refinance.  If the bank is discovered to 
be passive, its manager is fired (we assume that the threat of firing is credible). 
The timing of the model is as follows.  In period 1, the government chooses D 
and the bank lends to a single project (it will simplify the analysis to limit attention to 
just one project).  In period 2, returns are observed, and the bank decides whether or not 
to liquidate a poor project (let a be the probability of liquidation).  Directly afterward, 
the government monitors and fires the manager if discovered to be passive.  At the end 
of the period, the government recapitalizes the bank by injecting an amount of capital K 
(by assumption, a negative net position for the bank must be covered by the 
government). 
The government’s problem is to minimize the expected value of C(D) +  K 
subject to the bank’s position being nonnegative at the end of period 2.  The bank’s 
payoff is  { } r + Pi , 0 max , where Pi is the net return from lending and  r is a private 
benefit that is lost if the manager is fired.  If Pi turns out to be negative, the government 
must make up the difference.  Thus  { } 0 , i K P - = . 
The bank’s problem is to choose a to maximize 
( ) { } [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) [ ].   2 1 1 1 1 0 , 1 1 max r a r a r a a + - - - + + - - + + - + + - p g g R q D R a L R a
 
It follows immediately that there is a threshold value of  D below which the bank will 
choose to be passive and above which it will set a = 1.  Although D is costly, setting it 
too low means that with probability  ( )( )( ) q a - - - 1 1 1 a  the bank loses money, in which 
case the government must bail it out.  Hence, equilibrium will entail either the 
government choosing D sufficiently high so as to induce the bank to choose a = 1 or 
choosing  D = 0 because  C(D) is too high relative to the benefit of having the bank 
choose a = 1.   
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3.5.2 Rent -Seeking by Banks 
In the previous subsection, a bank received a subsidy from the government to 
keep it solvent, but there are other reasons for bailouts.  In this subsection, following 
Berglöf and Roland (1995), we explore the possibility that the government will 
subsidize a bank in order to induce it to refinance poor projects.  This sort of effect—
which is an important feature of transitional economies (see Anderson and Kegels, 
1997) and Perotti (1993)—derives from the likelihood that the government, unlike the 
bank, cares not only about verifiable revenue but also about such “external effects” as 
workers’ employment. 
To explore this effect, assume now that L > Rp – 1, i.e., that the bank does not 
directly benefit from refinancing a poor projects.  Suppose that in period 0 the 
government endows the bank with  N units of capital.  Assume that the cost of this 
capitalization is  ( )N l + 1  (where l represents the deadweight loss associated with 
raising the capital).  A total of N projects could, in principle, be financed, but the bank 
may choose to finance only k (and keep reserves N – k).  In period 1 —when poor 
projects are subject to r efinancing—the government may provide a subsidy  
S (at cost S (1 + l)).  The subsidy is paid after the bank commits to bailing out poor 
projects.  By assumption, the government cannot recover the returns from refinancing; 
its only instrument is S.  However, because the government maximizes total welfare, it 
is willing to pay the subsidy if the benefit it promotes exceeds the deadweight loss it 
creates, i.e. if 
( ) ( ) .   1 1 S E B R k a p p p l > - + + -  
If the bank’s liquidity position can be observed perfectly by the government, the subsidy 
will exactly cover the extra funds needed to bail out poor projects: 
( ) [ ] ( ).   1 k N R k S g - - - - = a a
             (28)  
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For its part, the bank will accept the subsidy if  S at least offsets the loss from 
refinancing: 
( ) ( ) .   0 1 1 ‡ - + - - p R L k S a   (29) 
From (28) and (29), it is easy to verify that if k = N, the bank will accept the subsidy 
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Hence, a necessary condition for SBCs is that the proportion of good projects be 
sufficiently low.  Even though a fall in  a increases the loss from refinancing, it 
increases the subsidy even more (provided that Rp – L > 0).  One way to restore a HBC 
is for the bank to set aside reserves by financing fewer than N projects.  Specifically, if 













it will refuse any subsidy that the government is willing to offer. 
If the government could identify the bad loans in the banks’ portfolio, it could 
refinance them itself, e.g., by transferring them to a specialized government agency.  
Such “hospital” agencies have b een set up in many transitional economies to clean up 
bank portfolios and to avoid subsidizing banks for refinancing poor projects.  If all bad 
loans were transferred, the government’s expenses would exceed those from subsidizing 
the bank, since the government would have to bear the full cost of refinancing.  
However, not all bad loans need be transferred to discourage the bank from rent-seeking 
and thus to harden enterprises’ budget constraints.  It suffices that 
* k k ‡ , where  
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) .   0 1 1 1
* * * = - + - - - - - - p g R L k k N R k a a a  
To summarize, sufficient ex ante capitalization can reduce a bank’s incentive to 
extract subsidies from the government to bail-out poor projects.  Another way of  
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achieving the same end is to create a hospital bank that siphons off sufficiently many 
bad loans to make rent-seeking unprofitable. 
Transferring bad loans may be more difficult when the government does not 
know how many such loans a bank has in its portfolio.  Mitchell (1995) shows that 
punitive measures directed against bank management may lead the bank to conceal or 
underestimate the extent of bad loans.  By contrast, Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999) 
show that policies in which the bank is recapitalized in compensation for bad debts may 
give it the incentive to overstate its bad debt problem.  One way to strike a proper 
balance between these two effects is through a scheme that combines partial 
recapitalization with the transfer of bad loans out of the bank’s portfolio. Aghion, 
Bolton, and Fries (1999) work out the transfer “price” that the bank must receive for 
loans to ensure incentive compatibility. 
Faure-Grimand and Rochet (1998) study the consequences of different modes of 
privatization for SBCs, specifically, the question of whether it is better to put current or 
new management in charge of banks.  They suppose that a current manager has a better 
knowledge of the loan portfolio than a newcomer.  But as a result, the manager has an 
advantage in extracting surplus from enterprises if refinancing occurs.  This superior 
surplus-extraction  ability may exacerbate the  SBC syndrome because it makes 
refinancing more likely.  Thus, the authors conclude that it may be better to put 
newcomers in charge precisely because their information is worse. 
3.5.3 Lenders of Last Resort 
When there is financial-market failure (e.g., a breakdown of the interbank 
lending market), it may be desirable for the government to step in and provide liquidity 
to prevent bank run contagion.  Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) show that in recent 
years a high percentage of failing banks have enjoyed government bailouts
16.  But 
bailing out illiquid banks is costly.  The cost of bailout has been as high as 30% of GDP 
                                                   
16 In their sample of 104 failing banks, 73 were rescued and only 31 were liquidated.  
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in Japan and 27% in Mexico (Freixas (1999)), bringing the central bank’s role as lender 
of last resort (LOLR) into  serious question
17.   
Having a central bank as LOLR was first proposed by Thornton (1802), with the 
details worked out by Bagehot (1873).  The Bagehot rules emphasize that a central bank 
should lend only to solvent but illiquid institutions (i.e., those with good collateral).  
Clearly, this is intended to curb the SBCs of banks. 
Following the Bagehot logic, non-interventionists argue that bailouts distort the 
incentives of bank managers and induce them to take excessive risk (Goodfriend and 
King (1988); T. Humphrey (1989); and Schwartz (1995)).  To avoid the SBC problem, 
they suggest that the central bank should intervene only at the macroeconomic level 
through open market operations.  Their critics retort that a bank’s failure generates 
externalities, such as bank-run contagion; and so bailing banks out may be efficient after 
all (Mishkin (1995); Santomero and Hoffman (1998); Freixas (1999); Freixas, Parigi 
and Rochet (1998)).  Moreover, the Bagehot rule of lending only to solvent banks is 
often not implementable because solvency is difficult to determine.  Indeed, Goodhart 
(1995) contends that in most cases it is impossible to distinguish illiquidity from 
insolvency.  Finally, it is debatable whether the central bank should confine its bailouts 
to solvent banks, since as Goodhart and Huang (1999) argue, letting even insolvent 
banks go under may trigger bank runs.  Indeed, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) 
make the case that it is really only insolvent banks that need lending of last resort 
anyway. 
Goodhart and  Huang (1999) suggest that one way to limit the SBC problem 
when the central bank acts as LOLR would be to restrict bailouts to very large banks.  
That is, a too-large-to-fail policy may be optimal.  Freixas (1999) argues instead for a 
“creative ambiguity”  approach: bailing out banks randomly.  Huang and Xu (1999a) 
show that although the too-large-to-fail policy may be optimal when restricted to short-
                                                   
17 Particularly, in the U.S. savings and loan crisis, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the 
failure of Crédit Lyonnais, and the collapse of Long Term Credit Bank of Japan.  
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run and narrowly defined problems, it may lead in the long run to inefficient bank 
mergers, which could be harmful.  Indeed, if all banks were large, they would all qualify 
to be bailed out, giving rise to an aggravated SBC problem.  Thus, Huang and Xu 
(1999a) argue, the optimal LOLR policy should not be separated from financial reforms 
such as decentralization of banking.  
3.5.4 Financial Crisis 
Various authors (e.g., Krugman (1998)) have argued informally that certain 
financial policies, such as bailing out firms and banks and providing government 
guarantees to private investment had much to do with the East Asian financial crisis that 
began in 1997.  Such policies are, of course, intimately connected with SBCs; indeed, 
Kim and Lee (1998) explicitly use the term “soft budget constraint” to describe the 
recent financial problems in Korea. 
Huang and Xu (1999a) develop a formal theory to explain financial crises from 
the standpoint of the SBC syndrome.  In their model, there are many banks, each of 
which receives deposits and invests in enterprises’ projects.  Banks rely on the interbank 
lending market to ease liquidity shortage problems when they face liquidity shocks.  
There are numerous depositors who, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), are divided 
between early consumers (those who consume only at date 1) and late consumers (who 
consume only at date 2).  Ex ante all depositors are identical in that they do not know 
their own types until date 1 and make their deposit decisions ex ante.  There are many 
enterprises, which have to rely on banks to finance their projects.  Projects are of two 
types, good and poor, as in the previous sections. 
As in the models of subsection 3.4, enterprises’ budget constraints will be hard if 
projects are financed by multiple banks.  In contrast, they will be soft if projects are 
financed by single banks (or by the government). 
Whether there are hard or soft budget constraints, every bank stores the optimal 
amount of cash to meet expected early consumer withdrawals.  The interbank lending 
market is an instrument for banks to avoid bank runs when some of them face  
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idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, i.e., excess early withdrawals.  In a hard budget 
constraint economy, a bank liquidates any poor project that it has funded, and the 
liquidation is observable by other banks as well.  Given this common information, a 
bank has no problem borrowing if it faces excess early withdrawals.  And so bank runs 
do not occur.  In an SBC economy, project types are not publicly known, because poor 
projects are not terminated.  Thus when a bank faces liquidity shocks and needs to 
borrow, potential lenders assume that its portfolio is poor.  This raises the cost of 
borrowing.  Thus, when a liquidity shock is sufficiently severe, even banks with good 
projects may be forced into liquidation.  Anticipating this, depositors may be induced to 
make larger than normal early withdrawals, possibly precipitating a bank run. 
Rochet and Tirole (1996) study how interbank lending itself can create SBCs.  
Imagine that bank A is in distress and that, according to the interbank agreement, bank 
B is supposed to lend to it.  Such a loan may leave the lender insolvent, requiring rescue 
by the central bank.  But the prospect of this rescue will dull bank B’s incentives to 
monitor A. 
3.6  Other Conceptions of the SBC 
In subsections 3.1 through 3.5, we have examined models that conceive of the SBC 
syndrome as a problem of dynamic commitment.  In our view, this has been a fruitful 
approach for understanding the syndrome.  At the same time, there have been several 
interesting alternative conceptions as well. 
3.6.1 Extra Subsidies for Extra Employment 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) associate the SBC syndrome with subsidies 
paid to enterprises to induce them to retain excess labor.  There is no dynamic element 
to their model and hence no problem of commitment. 
Consider a firm with profit function  P(a), where a, a measure of the firm’s 
effort, can assume two values, a
* and a
**.  Assume that   
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( ) ( ).  
* * * a a P > P   (30) 
Suppose that the government has payoff function  ( ) ( ) t a a B - P + b , where  t 
represents a payment from the government to the firm’s manager and  b corresponds to 
the fraction of the firm’s profit owned by the government (suppose that the remaining 
fraction 1 - b is owned by the manager).  The function B(￿) incorporates any objective 
besides profit that matters to the government, e.g.,  employment, output, or consumer 
surplus.  Let us suppose that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).     and  
* * * * * * * * * a a B a a B a B a B P + > P + >   (31) 
The two inequalities imply that the government prefers a
** to a
*. 
Let us distinguish among three cases.  We call pure centralization the case in 
which the government owns both the profit rights (i.e., b = 1) and the control rights to 
the firm (i.e., the government gets to choose  a).  Under pure centralization, the 
government will choose a = a
**, given assumption (31).  Although this choice may not 
be socially optimal (unless perhaps B(￿) is a good measure of consumer surplus)—and, 
in view of (30), is certainly not profit-maximizing—it entails no transfers and hence no 
SBC. 
The case of a transitional economy is the one in which b is big, but the manager 
has control.  Now t he government will have to “bribe” the manager in order to 
implement the action a = a** (the manager has payoff function (1 - b)P (a) + b, where b 
is the size of the bribe he receives).  Suppose that the government must make a take-it-
or-leave-it offer.  It will be worthwhile doing so provided that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,   0 1
* * * * * * * * * > P - P - - P - P + - a a C a a a B a B b b   (32) 
where C(x) is the cost (to the government) of making a bribe of size x. C(x) may well be 
substantially bigger than x, e.g., because of the deadweight loss from raising the revenue 
to pay the bribe (if this is of concern to the government) or the risks entailed in 
circumventing anti-bribery laws.  However, if b is high, then the manager requires a  
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relatively low bribe and so, in view of (31), (32) is likely to hold.  Thus, the equilibrium 
choice is a = a
** , the same as under pure centralization.  The difference, of course, is 
that now a bribe is needed to sustain  a**, and this itself may create inefficiencies.  
Finally, consider the case of pure decentralization, in which b is low and the manager 
has control.  Here, the cost of bribery may be very high (if C(￿) increases rapidly), and 
so (32) may well be negative; in which case the manager will choose a = a
* (the profit-
maximizing action), and there is no bribe. 
Notice that it is the assumption that C(x) > > x that drives the profit-maximizing 
result in this last case.  If C(x) = x, then in all three cases, the left hand side of (32) 
reduces to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),  
* * * * * * a a a B a B P - P + -  
which, from (31), is positive.  That is a = a
* is optimal regardless of the d istribution of 
ownership rights (this is just an example of the Coase theorem).  Thus the profit-
enhancing properties of decentralization are due to bribes being particularly costly in 
that case. 
Observe that the very concept of decentralization is quite d ifferent from that in 
subsection 3.4.  In that earlier section the term meant “diffuseness of power” (either 
financial or productive), but here it means taking profit-ownership and control out of the 
hands of government. 
Another difference turns on the concept of optimality.  In the models of 
subsection 3.4, decentralization led to a higher social surplus than centralization.  In this 
last model, such a result is not so clear: centralization entails maximizing B(a) + P(a), 
whereas decentralization implies maximizing P(a).  Thus, only if the former objective 
is a worse approximation to “social surplus” than the latter does decentralization 
dominate.  In particular, if B(a) corresponds to consumer surplus, centralization would 
dominate.  
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3.6.2 The SBC as a Control Instrument 
Bai and Wang (1996) show that SBC may be deliberately introduced by a center 
in order to control an agent.  Suppose that the center owns a large number of potential 
projects but must rely on an agent to assess each project’s profitability and hence 
whether or not it should be launched.  Suppose that a project, if launched, takes two 
periods to complete and requires a capital input costing c each period.  The agent can 
exert (unobservable and costly) effort to pre-screen the expected gross returns of a 
fraction e of these projects ex ante (where e increases with effort).  It then launches a 
number of the potential projects, including all projects that pre-screening indicates are 
profitable (i.e., the projects whose gross return exceeds 2 c), but possibly also some 
projects that have not been pre-screened.  At the end of the first period, it learns the 
expected gross returns of all launched projects and can choose to terminate some of 
them, thereby saving the cost c of continuing them for a second period.  Presumably, 
any project that is terminated would be one that is unprofitable to complete (i.e., one for 
which the expected gross return is less than c), but, as we will see, not all unprofitable 
contracts ought to be terminated. 
The agent requires a fee from the center to induce it to exert effort.  But because 
effort is unobservable, the fee must be made contingent on the variables that the center 
can observe: the total net return (which is assumed to be the sum of the expected gross 
returns of  completed projects less the capital costs of all completed and terminated 
projects, plus noise), the number of projects launched, and the number of projects 
terminated after the first period.  Assume that, on average, a project that is not pre-
screened turns out to be unprofitable to complete.  Bai and Wang show nevertheless that 
if the agent is risk-averse then the optimal fee schedule will have the proportions that 
the agent should (i) launch some project that it has not pre-screened and (ii) allow some 
unprofitable projects to be completed. 
To see why this is so, suppose that there are just two possible effort levels: an 
optimal level and lower level.  Then one would expect that, when confronted with the  
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optimal fee schedule, the agent will be left just indifferent between these two levels (i.e., 
his “incentive constraint” will be binding).  Now suppose, contrary to the claim, that the 
agent launches no project that it has not pre-screened (i.e., the set of projects launched 
consists only of projects that pre-screening indicates are profitable).  Suppose that the 
center now slightly increases the number of projects it requires to be launched.  This 
will, in effect, force the agent to launch some projects that it has not pre-screened.  
Since this change will reduce the overall net return on average, it will lower the agent’s 
expected fee.  Thus the agent’s expected utility will fall, whether he exerts the optimal 
or lower level of effort.  But because his expected marginal utility of income is higher 
when effort is low (since his expected fee is lower), his expected utility will fall more in 
that case than when his effort is optimal.  Hence, the agent’s incentive constraint will be 
relaxed, which, given that the fall in the agent’s utility when he exerts optimal effort is 
zero to the first order, means that the fee schedule could not have been optimal to begin 
with, and so property (i) is established.  For exactly the same reason, if the center 
slightly decreases the number of projects it requires to be terminated after the first 
period (i.e., slightly increases the number of projects it requires to be completed), the 
agent’s expected utility will again fall more for low effort than for optimal effort, 
implying the same sort of incentive relaxation as before.  This establishes property (ii). 
4. Concluding Remarks 
4.1 A Broad Range of Phenomena, a Common Framework of Analysis. 
The SBC syndrome embraces a broad range of phenomena from economic life, 
and there are many different reasons why the budget constraint may be softened. 
Nevertheless, the syndrome  gives rise to specific and predictable patterns of  behavior 
among economic agents. We hope to have convinced the reader that models of dynamic 
commitment problems provide some analytic insight into these patterns and that the 
SBC concept is a useful unifying device.  Most of the work discussed in this article  
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applies the terminology and conceptual apparatus of the literature on SBC and refers to 
its theoretical antecedents. However, some papers mentioned do not invoke these 
concepts or language. We do not wish to suggest that these are fatal omissions.  
Nevertheless, we feel that something of importance may thereby be lost. 
Numerous examples in the history of the social sciences indicate that vividly 
descriptive concepts, metaphors, models, or analytical tools can have an inspirational 
effect (a classic instance is the enormous fruitfulness of the prisoner’s dilemma game in 
economics and political science). They highlight the essence of complex situations and 
encourage researchers to seek similarities across apparently disparate phenomena.  We 
believe that the notions, theories, and models of the SBC framework have played such 
an inspiring role and can continue to do so.  Time and again, researchers who are 
steeped in the conceptual apparatus and analytical methods of the SBC syndrome have 
drawn and reinforced connections that have escaped others’ attention. 
4.2 Extensions Beyond Socialism and Post-Socialist Transition 
We have mentioned repeatedly that the idea of the SBC was initially inspired by the 
study of socialism and that it has recently attracted a great deal of attention through its 
application to problems of post-socialist transition. However, we have noted that the 
SBC syndrome should not be thought of as wedded only to the socialist system or to 
transitional economies. It can arise in any economic system. All that is needed is the 
confluence of certain elements: a BC-organization and one or several S-organizations 
with the  incentive to provide financial rescue.  Unquestionably, these elements come 
together more frequently and in a wider set of cases under socialism and post-socialist 
transition than under systems where socialism has never arisen. However, the effects of 
the SBC syndrome are clearly perceptible in the traditionally capitalist part of the world 
as well. 
There is, for instance, a large number of empirical studies demonstrating the 
existence and deleterious effect of the SBC syndrome in the public sectors of various  
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non-socialist countries.  Here are a few illustrations, running the gamut from developing 
to advanced economies: Raiser (1994) 32 developing countries: enterprises; Skoog 
(2000) Tanzania: enterprises; Anderson (1995) Middle-East Arab countries: enterprises; 
Bartel and Harrison (1999) Indonesia: enterprises; Majumdar (1998) India: enterprises; 
Tornell (1999) Latin-America: enterprises and banks; De Macedo (1990), Portugal: 
enterprises; Bertero and Rondi (2000) Italy: enterprises; Nett (1992) Italy: medical 
service; Levaggi and Zanola (2000) Italy: national health system; Moesen and Van 
Cauwenberge (2000) 19 OECD countries: local governments; Dahlberg and Petterson-
Lidblom (2002): Swedish local governments; Rodden et al. (2002): fiscal federalism; 
Duggan (2000) USA, hospitals.
18 
Huang and Xu (1998, 1999a) and Kim and Lee (1998) have pioneered the study 
of capitalist financial crises from the standpoint of the SBC syndrome.  In particular 
they provide micro-foundations for a macro-economic analysis of the East Asian crisis 
of the late 1990’s (see the discussion in subsection 3.5.4). It would be desirable to carry 
out similar research into earlier crises (e.g. the early 1990’s crisis in Mexico) and the 
current one in Argentina. In no case are we prepared to say that the SBC syndrome was 
the only cause. However, we believe that it was invariably one of the important 
contributing factors, with an influence that differs from country to country and crisis to 
crisis. In general, it seems a good way of understanding the accumulation of bad loans, 
the inflation of demand, and the creation of bubbles. 
Many students of the SBC syndrome compare economies of similar political and 
economic disposition (e.g., they examine the similarities and differences between two 
transitional economies).  Others contrast economies from opposite ends of the spectrum 
(e.g., they compare the SBC of socialist systems with the HBC of capitalist economies).  
But more general sorts of comparisons would probably require a more systematic 
methodological approach.  Such an approach would entail a set of strictly comparable 
                                                   
18 The list contains only studies that use the conceptual apparatus of the SBC 
literature.  
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indicators, with uniform definitions and rules of observation and measurement. 
Indicators such as those listed in Table 1 could be observed and measured with a 
standardized methodology in many countries. Of course, the obvious candidates for 
initiating and organizing the introduction of a uniform methodology are international 
financial institutions, e.g., the World Bank and EBRD. 
4.3 Softening and Hardening the Budget Constraint from a Secular Historical 
Perspective 
Studying the softening and hardening of budget constraints over historical time 
poses a formidable intellectual challenge, requiring a synthetic approach to changes in 
politics, society, the economy and the law.  Nevertheless, a few simple generalizations 
can be made.  In the early days of capitalism, the budget constraint was for the most part 
hard. Think, for example, of debtors’ prisons, of borrowers compelled to auction off 
their personal property, and of businessmen for whom the threat of bankruptcy led to 
suicide. Since that time the capitalist budget constraint has gradually softened. The 
introduction of the principle of limited liability in corporate finance, less draconian 
bankruptcy regulations, and modern forms of separation and interweaving of ownership 
and management have all served to protect managers from the adverse consequences of 
their actions. Indeed, the fact that the executives of a corporation can survive the 
financial ruin of the company they manage without losing their own property may have 
created a mentality similar to that under the SBC syndrome.  A critical review o f 
modern capitalism in the light of SBC phenomena would certainly seem extremely 
worthwhile. 
The history of SBC’s under the socialist system is interesting as well.  In pre-
reform socialism, SBC’s permeated all organizations.  The first market reforms 
attempted to impose the requirement that the budget constraint be hardened, but such 
attempts largely failed.  To understand this failure calls for an interdisciplinary study, a 
demanding undertaking.  But, in our view, the potential benefits clearly outweigh the 
costs.  
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4.4  Normative Implications 
The work reviewed in this paper is, for the most part, positive  in nature. The 
“meta-model” of the typical research pattern can be described as follows: An author 
singles out some aspect of the SBC phenomenon, devises a model that focuses on some 
of the causes and consequences, and abstracts away the others. Policy implications of 
the analysis are drawn with caution because of the acknowledged limitations of the 
model. 
Of course, the need for normative caution is common to economic research far 
beyond that on the SBC syndrome.  No single theoretical work can be expected to give 
a comprehensive analysis of the causes and effects of any complex phenomenon.  
Nevertheless, a responsible decision about whether, say, an indebted corporation should 
be rescued can be reached only after consideration of all direct and indirect 
consequences. 
Such matters are rarely clear-cut.  The SBC literature may give the impression 
that hardness is “good” and softness “bad.” But if this were literally true, it is hard to 
imagine that the SBC syndrome would be so widespread or recurrent.  
The dilemma is especially agonizing when the rescue of  an entire economic 
sector or nation is on the agenda.  Almost always, preservation of national stability 
provides a strong argument for going through with such a bailout.  Yet even in these cases, 
the logic is not completely one-sided, since rescue will presumably have unfortunate 
repercussions on expectations of future bailouts, contributing to the perpetuation of SBC 
phenomena.  
A major shortcoming of the literature on the SBC is the absence of a systematic 
exploration of normative implications.   No one expects to devise a simple formula that 
will determine, in any given situation, the breadth and magnitude of the bailout that is 
called for.  Still, comprehensive normative evaluation seems a feasible scientific task.  
Potential short-term consequences of a bailout can be clearly enumerated.  Theoretical 
and empirical examination of the tradeoffs between short-run benefits and long-run  
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costs is more difficult, since it must draw on political, sociological, and even ethical 
thinking, besides purely economic analysis.  But it seems far from impossible. 
We trust that our review of the rich literature on the SBC syndrome will provide 
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INDICATORS OF THE SOFTNESS/HARDNESS OF THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT OF THE FIRM 
 
Phenomena represented by the measurement 
 
Studies applying the measurement 
 
Instruments of softening 
 
1.  Subsidies or other contributions of the state   
- percentage of GDP or total budget  EBRD (1997) 
Gao and Schaffer (1998) 
Raiser (1994, 1996) 
- percentage of firms reporting subsidies  Earle and Estrin (1998) 
EBRD (1999) 
2. Soft taxation   
- tax arrears as a percentage of GDP or total 
budget 
Djankov and Kreacic (1998) 
EBRD (1997) 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000) 
Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000) 
Schaffer (1998) 
Sjöberg and Gang (1996) 




- survey: perception of the phenomenon  Tóth (1998) 
 
3. Soft bank credit   
3a Preference for distressed firms in credit 
allocation 
Brana, Maurel and Sgard (1999) 
Budina, Garretsen and de Jong (2000) 
Gao and Schaffer (1998) 
Schaffer (1998) 
3b “Bad” loans 
(e.g. as a percentage of total 
outstanding loans) 
Bonin and Schaffer (1995) 
EBRD (1997, 1998) 
Gao and Schaffer (1998) 
3c Arrears of repayment of loans  Cull and Xu (2000)  
  77
(e.g. as a percentage of total outstanding 
loans or bank credit and bank arrear 
correlation) 
Dobrinsky (1994) 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000) 
Gao and Schaffer (1998) 
Perotti and Carare (1997) 
3d Unusual debt/equity ratio or debt/asset ratio  Budina, Garretsen and de Jong (2000) 
Majumdar (1998) 
Gao and Schaffer (1998) 
3e Unusual cash-flow/debt ratio  Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, Djankov and  
(1997) 
3f Survey: subjective assessment  Tóth (1998) 
 
4. Excess trade-credit   
- overdue trade credit as a percentage of 
GDP or total capital 
Bonin and Schaffer (1995) 
EBRD (1997) 
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (2000) 
Gang and Sjöberg(1996 INCOMPLETE) 
Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000) 
Schaffer (1998) 
- Survey: subjective assessment  Tóth (1998) 
 
Expectation of rescue   
5. Survey data about subjective probabilities 
concerning the expectation of rescue 
Anderson, Korsun and Murrell (2000) 
 
   
Characteristics of the exit process   
6. Survival of organizations in financial 
trouble (chronic deficit, insolvency, 
accelerating growth of indebtness) 
(e.g. loss-makers as a percentage of all firms) 
Claessens and Peters (1997) 
EBRD (1997) 
Gao and Schaffer (1998) 
Li and Liang (1998) 
 
7. Frequency of bankruptcies and liquidations, 
filed and executed 
Bonin and Schaffer (1995) 
EBRD (1997)  
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8. Frequency of bail-outs  Li and Liang (1998) 
 
Note: The table refers only to those subsidies which use in an explicit form the language of the SBC 
Theory, and apply the indicators mentioned in the left column for measuring the 
softness/hardness of the budget constraint. 
 
 